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DESIGNING RESILIENT INSTITUTIONS FOR
TRANSBOUNDARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A TIME FOR
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
ARJEN BOIN ANDMARTIN LODGE
Crises and disasters feature high on political and public agendas around the world. Practition-
ers wrestle with the challenge to provide protection while maintaining legitimacy. They pine for
insights that lie at the heart of public administration: designing effective institutions and preserv-
ing transparency; enabling and empowering citizens without undermining a coordinated response;
balancing long-term risks against short-term needs; bridging the divide between theory and prac-
tice, and between the public and private sectors. But in the debates about designing institutions that
protect against transboundary threats and critical infrastructure failures, the public administration
community is strangely absent. It has parked itself on the sideline, concerning itself with the routine
processes of governance. In this article, we argue that the time has come for public administration
scholars to incorporate crisis and disaster management into the main research agendas of the field.
A NEWNORMAL?
In her recent book The Social Roots of Risk, Kathleen Tierney (2014, p. 238) proclaims that
‘mega-disasters are the new normal’. True or not, both social scientists and practitioners
share a sense that the stability and prosperity of Western society are being undermined
(OECD 2003, 2011; Cottey 2007; Perrow 2007; Hutter 2010; Goldin and Mariathasan 2014).
They describe a combination of increased vulnerabilities, new threats, critical infrastruc-
ture failures, eroding institutions, political fragmentation and a lack of response capacities.
In the face of these observed developments, unrelenting and threatening as they appear,
one might wonder how modern society has, so far, managed to survive.
Anxiety about stability, prosperity and a changing threat environment is, of course, not
an exclusively contemporary concern. This very journal was established in the early 1920s
with the explicit rationale to contribute to knowledge about the future of government and
the role of public administration internationally – at a time when political, social and eco-
nomic systems were in turmoil. In more recent times, the idea of the ‘risk society’ (Beck
1992) points to a growing concern with large technical systems, the environment and the
declining societal trust in expertise and authority.
In that context, a contemporaneous incarnation of how to manage risks can be found
in the ‘face-off’ between High Reliability scholars such as Todd LaPorte and Paul Schul-
man and organization theorists such as Charles Perrow and Lee Clarke (Rosenthal
and Kouzmin 1994). Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accident Theory famously predicted that
increased complexity and tight coupling would inevitably produce disasters that cannot
be controlled by the organizations that create them. High Reliability scholars point out
that some organizations have found ways to reliably work with complex technologies
and critical infrastructure failures; the implicit promise holds that organizational practices
can be reformed to make accidents less likely (LaPorte 1996; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007; Roe
and Schulman 2016).
This debate, in turn, is rooted in the controversy that surrounded Aaron Wildavsky’s
(1988) advocacy of resilience as a much better strategy to overcome crises and disasters
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than an expensive and ultimately ineffective focus on prevention by anticipation and
regulation.
These are fascinating debates, and they are still worth studying. They were not staged
in the pages of public administration or public management journals, however. In fact, the
public administration community – with a few exceptions aside – has been notably silent
on the topic of preparing modern society for threats old and new. True, the international
public administration community briefly relaxed its focus on routine processes of gover-
nance after the 9/11 (and subsequent) terrorist attacks and the Hurricane Katrina disaster,
but this shift has not given rise to a new research agenda.
We argue that the time has come for scholars of public administration to paymore exten-
sive and systematic attention to the challenges of building a resilient society. Two trends,
in particular, deserve the attention of scholars in public administration and governance.
First, there is the rise of new threat agents. Emerging technologies such as 3D print-
ing, artificial intelligence, and DNA engineering are likely to create unforeseen and even
unimaginable threats. Rapid political developments (for example, power shifts in Asia
and the Middle East) and the impact of climate change have altered the threat environ-
ment. These developments are already affecting national and transnational politics, and
therefore present public administration with urgent questions regarding the political and
administrative feasibility of governing particular risks (Lodge and Wegrich 2012; Lodge
2013; Light 2016).
Second, it appears that we are seeing more crises and disasters with transboundary
characteristics (Ansell et al. 2010; Goldin and Mariathasan 2014). Transboundary crises
revolve around threats that easily cut across geographical and/or policy boundaries
(different examples include the ash crisis, the refugee crisis, the financial breakdown and
terrorism). By definition, these crises do not fall within the boundaries of a country or
the defined bureaucratic boundaries of a policy sector (Hameiri and Jones 2015). Cyber
threats exemplify this notion that traditional borders may simply have become irrelevant
for some types of crisis.
In recent years, a series of crises and disasters has demonstrated that the political-
administrative systems in place are easily outmatched by new and unforeseen threats.
Hurricane Katrina, the financial crisis, and terrorist attacks in capital cities have in com-
mon that the processes and structures in place did not detect particular threats, and
responses were characterized as lacking timeliness and effectiveness. It is always easy to
criticize the performance of traditional bureaucracies with the wisdom of hindsight. But
the analysis of crisis cases makes clear that administrative actors and political leaders
generally find it very hard to deal with the dynamics of crisis and disaster (for case
analyses, see Rosenthal et al. 1989, 2001; Helsloot et al. 2012).
These case descriptions suggest challenges and issues that appear ubiquitous in
large-scale crises and disasters. We summarize these issues here in a set of themes that, we
argue, should help to shape a crisis research agenda for public administration scholars.
TOWARDS A RESEARCH AGENDA: KEY THEMES IN THE STUDY OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
Prevention, risk management and regulation
Contemporary societies are characterized by low risk tolerance. Even seemingly minor
incidents can invite public indignation and political recrimination, which, in turn, trigger
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‘knee-jerk responses’ that evoke scorn on the part of academics and experts. The contem-
porary obsession with risk has resulted in a bureaucratic network of risk watchers, crisis
flak-catchers, and high-fee advisers whose job is to protect reputations by shuffling blame
away (Rothstein et al. 2006; Power 2007; Rothstein and Downer 2012). Risk management
has become, some say, a ‘new religion’ (Bernstein 1996).
A literature on risk regulation has spawned in response (Hood and Jones 1996; Rothstein
et al. 2013), with some important input from public administration scholars (for example,
Hood et al. 2001). However, overall the field of public administration has paid only limited
attention to the issue of ‘risk’. This is remarkable, as ‘risk’ has become central to contempo-
rary governing; see, for example, the public sector reforms that encourage risk-taking by
public servants and embrace risk in policy strategies, the continued transatlantic debates
about the precautionary principle and new technologies, or the idea of ‘risk-based regula-
tion’ as a guiding principle for regulatory activities (Black 2010).
This literature tells us that tools of risk management and regulation face severe limi-
tations when it comes to ‘known unknowns’; their pay-off is ill understood in cases of
‘unknown unknowns’ (Clarke 1999). The art of preparing for unknown threats, then, is
based on identifying generic capacities that can be applied to a large number of possible
events. But even then one can never be sure that available risk tools apply to all possible
events.
How tools of risk management and regulation help to prepare for recurring crises and
disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, technical break-downs and large-scale indus-
trial accidents, critical infrastructure failures, epidemics, or invasive species, remains an
important area for further scholarly attention. We do not really know, for example, how
organizations in different sectors, individually and collectively, monitor emerging risks
and study near misses. Moreover, more needs to be known about how risk management
and regulation are coordinated in the context of multilevel governance systems. One chal-
lenge is to understand howparticular instruments and approaches interact with particular
risks and crises. Another challenge is to understand whether and how these instruments
and approaches contribute to, or even generate, their own risks and crises (reflecting a
variant defined by Wildavsky (1989, p. 62) as ‘policy as its own cause’).
Preparing the strategic level
In the past decade or so, Western states have made great strides in professionalizing their
emergency services and in establishing formal contingencymanagement structureswithin
civilian bureaucracies across all levels of government. First responders, in particular, now
benefit from fairly extensive training programmes that are reasonably well funded.2 The
emergency services have invested in crisis management skills and resources (means of
communication, simulations, decision-making training and suchlike) since the start of the
twenty-first century. It has since become increasingly evident that problems in the response
to crises are found at the strategic rather than the operational level.
We know which important tasks typically await strategic leaders and their crisis teams
(Boin et al. 2005): they have to detect from faint signals that something out of the ordinary is
developing; and they have to collect, share, analyse and disseminate critical information to
form a picture of the situation. Based on their situational assessment, they are required to
make critical decisions where needed and organize a coordinated response to implement
their decisions. All this has to be communicated in a timely and effectivemanner,with both
internal and external stakeholders. In the aftermath of the crisis, strategic leaders have to
account for the response and ensure that the right lessons are learned.
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We have a fairly good idea which organizational and individual actions are likely to
produce an effective fulfilment of these tasks. But given the limited number of observations
(there are simply not that many comparable crises and disasters), we have to treat these
insights as hypotheses. What we really do not know is how the effective fulfilment of
these tasks contributes to a legitimate handling of the crisis. In other words, we do not
really know just how important strategic crisismanagement is, evenwhenperformedwell.
The importance of political leadership (at all levels) during a crisis is often assumed, but
it has not been demonstrated beyond doubt.
Then there is the issue of improvisation. Crises stretch institutions to the limit, rendering
standard operating procedures inapplicable and severely testing professional norms. Insti-
tutions are thus forced to work outside established routines and practices. This, in turn,
means that adaptation and improvisation are critical capacities. But what does improvisa-
tion entail, exactly? When working outside the rules is effective, we talk about improvisa-
tion. When it is not, we speak of deviation (and discuss the importance of human error).
We do not know how to teach leaders and organizations how to adapt and improvise in a
responsiblemanner; itmight even be argued that such ademand contradicts the basic char-
acteristics of a bureaucracy, which are stability and normalization through classification.
On the positive side, we should note that public administration scholars have done
very interesting and relevant work when it comes to the formal and emergent coordi-
nation structures that governments use in times of crisis. Kettl’s (2003) analysis of the
US coordinative structures, anchored in the Department of Homeland Security, helps to
clarify the difficulties of crisis coordination in a particular federal system. Other scholars
have concentrated on coordination processes in response networks (Comfort 2006; Kapucu
2006; Moynihan 2009). While these studies are valuable and draw on wider theories of
inter-organizational (non-)cooperation, they are not systematically linked to the encom-
passing challenge of designing resilient societies.
Required skills and capacities for crisis leadership
Leadership continues to be a well-covered topic in public administration research (Van
Wart 2013; ’t Hart 2014). Yet, the research appears to yield few reliable patterns of lead-
ership behaviour and output. It has produced even fewer solid insights when it comes to
crisis leaders (but see Janis 1989). We do not knowwhy leaders are seen to be successful in
one crisis (Bush after 9/11) and then said to fail in another (Bush after Katrina) (Boin et al.
2010). We do not know which (if any) strategies or behaviours affect the effectiveness and
legitimacy of crisis and disaster management.
The executive crisis tasks outlined above provide a good starting point for study. With
an eye on the very different types of activities, we can envision the required qualities of
decision-making groups that support or operate at the political level. For instance, it would
make sense to combine analytical skills with skills for communication, decision-making,
and networking (see also Lodge and Wegrich 2014). Just by considering the various skills
and capacities that are likely needed, it becomes clear that these skills are unlikely to be
found in any one individual (formal leader or someone else). This, in turn, has impli-
cations for the selection and training of key personnel at the intersection of politics and
administration.
As yet, we know precious little about the requirements for effective performance during
crisis. We do not really know how individuals cope with crisis conditions. Psychologists
have traditionally paid much attention to individual reactions to stress and uncertainty
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(but much less to a combination of both). It is, however, much harder to simulate a per-
ception of threat. The combination of threat, urgency and uncertainty is rarely if ever used
in laboratory settings, meaning that there is a dearth of reliable data on the reactions of
(trained and untrained) crisis responders. Furthermore, it is questionable whether any
laboratory setting can resemble a real crisis (but see Kamphuis et al. 2011).
It is worth probing how different leadership skills and strategies relate to different
types of crisis. There appears to be a clear difference between acute crises (such as a
terrorist attack or a natural disaster) and slowly evolving threats, where both the source
of crisis and its consequences pose ongoing, changing and interdependent demands on
decision-makers (such as in the case of the financial or refugee crises). The nature of crises
will likely have an effect on the importance of certain crisis tasks and the required skills
of crisis leaders and their teams.
The politics of crisis management
The management of crises and disasters has long been studied in technical-professional
terms, as the skilled execution of plans and procedures to bring a situation back to normal.
While this perspective is still dominant in the literature on operational disaster manage-
ment, it is rapidly being replaced by a perspective that emphasizes the political nature of
crises and disasters.
In this view, crises are viewed as potential turning points. A crisis is defined as poten-
tially undermining legitimate orders, as institutions, policies and leaders are seen to be
failing to perform the core task of protection (’t Hart 1993). A crisis therefore opens up
opportunities for change (Kingdon 1984; Cortell and Peterson 1999). But it also fuels
so-called blame games that often have a distorting effect on accountability processes after
a crisis (Hood 2011; Resodihardjo et al. 2016).
We do not know why some leaders or administrations commit to learning processes,
whereas others engage in various types of blame games (Hood et al. 2016). We need to
know more about how institutional memory is being maintained and communicated
across fragmented organizational boundaries, especially in an era of public sector cut-
backs. We do not knowwhy some leaders seek a quick return to the status quo as it existed
before the crisis, whereas others seize on the opportunity to push for renewal and reform.
We do not know why some leaders are successful in implementing their chosen strategy,
whereas others fail. In other words, the political aftermath of crises and disasters is fertile
research ground.
Designing resilience
In response to the perceived increase in the number of large-scale crises and disasters, both
practitioners and academics have called for enhanced societal resilience (Aldrich 2012;
Stark 2014; Tierney 2014; Duit 2016). Various policy sectors (especially environment and
welfare) have embraced the notion of ‘resilience’. The proponents of resilience see unlim-
ited potential, as resilient systems are thought to absorb or bounce back from any shock
to the system. They find it difficult, however, to define what resilience actually is (a capac-
ity, a process, an outcome?). It is not always clear how resilience differs from either good
governance or crisis management.
In a minimal definition, resilience refers to the capacity of a system to quickly resume
critical functions that were affected by a shock to the system. Even if we could agree on
such a minimal definition (and no such agreement exists in the literature), it would still
prompt the question how resilience can be achieved (Comfort et al. 2010). The literature
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offers little if any feasible guidance when it comes to strategies or capacities that could
make societies (or organizations) more resilient. There clearly is a real research opportu-
nity here.
One might argue that societies can only be resilient if they have legitimate institutions.
The idea of the institution encompasses the capacity to preserve what is essential and to
adapt when necessary (Selznick 1957). Institutions have to reconcile tensions between con-
servative inclinations and the necessity to be responsive. The underlying question here is
whether there is actually a way of ‘engineering’ resilience, or whether resilience is the
result of random or highly contextual adaptations over time.
Building transboundary crisis management capacities
The financial crisis, the refugee flows and the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris have
recently demonstrated just howhard it is tomanage transboundary crises. In fact, it should
now be clear that the nation state and its traditional bureaucratic structures are no match
for these crises. What is needed, urgently, are transboundary crisis management capacities
that allow nation states to collaborate in a timely, effective and legitimate manner. In the
absence of such capacities, the benefits of economic integration will pale against perceived
risks, and nation states will seek to withdraw from the complex systems that have brought
progress to many.
Such questions do not just require advice and suggestions. They also provide for impor-
tant theoretical insights, whether they are about the informal assumptions underpinning
formal institutional arrangements that, under strain, can quickly come undone, the role
of accountability, oversight and performance management systems in facilitating and dis-
torting information flows, or about the interaction between different levels of government,
changing societal expectations and volatile politics (all of which are under pressure from
expenditure cuts).
In recent years, the international community has begun to build these capacities in inter-
national organizations such as the World Health Organization, NATO, the UN, and the
EU (Stone and Ladi 2015). The EU, especially, has constructed what could be considered
the pillars of a transboundary crisis management system (Boin et al. 2013). Practitioners
have achieved this without much help or interest from public administration scholars,
who have conveniently left EU matters in the hands of the specialized community of EU
scholars. Again, such a lack of interest is remarkable as ‘societal security’ has been at the
very heart of learned interest, going back to the day of cameralist thinking. Public admin-
istration scholars should seek to work with EU scholars and crisis management scholars
to discover under what conditions transboundary crisis management capacities emerge,
and how such capacities interact with existing institutions, and understandings of political
legitimacy, at the national and sub-national levels.3
A ROLE FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Public administration scholars study the conditions – processes, structures and strategies
(or actions) – that affect the quality of governance. It is generally assumed that the quality
of governance directly contributes to the quality of living. Crises and disasters have
(usually) a deteriorating effect on the quality of living, but also make it harder to maintain
the quality of governance (which, in turn, is related to the effectiveness of the response to
crises and disasters). All too often, lives depend on the way governments react to crises
and disasters. It follows that public administration scholars should study the causes,
characteristics and consequences of crises. They should also study how governments
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prepare for and deal with these events, which often happens in collaboration with
non-state actors.
Yet public administration scholars have not prioritized the study of crisis and disaster
management. They prefer to study routine processes of governance. The study of crisis and
disaster management remains the province of specialized journals and a niche group of
interdisciplinary academics and practitioners. If crises and disasters are indeed becoming
an integral part of the ‘new normal’, the time has come to bring the study of crises and
disasters into the mainstream. This symposium aims to provide a step in that direction.
This symposium
This symposium is a result of an open call for papers on the journal’s website. All papers
that were submitted were peer-reviewed. The following articles provide important com-
parative and theoretical insights into the study of crisis management.
Why do similar countries facing the same threat respond differently? To answer this
question, Erik Baekkeskov (2016) compared the national response to the 2009 Swine Fever
pandemic in the Netherlands and Denmark. Baekkeskov interviewed key actors in both
countries, thus considering together the policy histories of the critical decision taken in
each country about vaccination. Baekkeskov uncovers the critical role of experts in reach-
ing these decisions, which, in turn, evokes important questions about the legitimacy of
crisis decision-making processes.
Tom Christensen, Ole Danielsen, Per Lægreid and Lise Rykkja (2016) focus on the key
process of coordination during crises. To study the interplay between the necessities of
effective coordination and the characteristics of national systems, the authors compared
the crisis coordination structures of six countries. They found that countries offer unique
solutions to the challenge of combining contradictory organizational principles that, they
posit, are required for crisis coordination.
Helena Hermansson (2016) also discusses the intricacies of crisis coordination, this time
in the context of Turkey (a disaster-prone country). She describes the evolvement of the
Turkish response structure,which ismarked by centralization. The article further discusses
how the hybrid network of response actors accommodates the tension between decentral-
ization and centralization.
Sandra Resodihardjo, Brendan Carroll, Carola van Eijk and Sanne Maris (2016) studied
the accountability processes after two dance festival disasters (one in Holland, one in Ger-
many). They observe that local crisis managers (the mayor and police chief) responded
differently to the criticism heaped upon them. The authors seek to understand in this
article what factors impact the dynamics of these blame games, focusing in particular on
institutional context and accountability rituals.
Andreas Duit (2016) criticizes the emerging conception of resilience in the field of pub-
lic administration. Resilience is a concept taken from ecology studies. Duit shows that
the insights of ecology studies cannot simply be transferred to public administration. He
identifies three key shortcomings of social-ecological resilience thinking: (1) deterministic
systems models; (2) simplified accounts of politics and policy; and (3) a lack of systematic
and generalizable empirical studies.
Wout Broekema (2016) explores the relation between politicization and learning after
oil spill disasters. Broekema is particularly interested to study how and what the EU has
learned from these disasters. He examined to what extent the content of political claims
in the mass media, national parliaments and crisis evaluation reports made their way into
EU legislation.
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Daniel Aldrich (2016) asks why some coastal communities in Japan recovered quickly
after the 2011 Fukushima disaster whereas others lagged behind. His research draws on a
new dataset of roughly 40 disaster-affected cities, towns and villages. The best predictor
of recovery, Aldrich finds, is the number of powerful politicians representing the area in
the national government.
Lan Xue and Xiaoli Lu (2016) analyse China’s emergency management system, which
has been thoroughly renewed since the SARS crisis. The new system has already been
tested by various large-scale crises and disasters. The authors discuss the performance
of China’s new emergency management system with a special focus on the challenges of
sense-making. They conclude that the systemwill need some further tweaking to enhance
its crisis management performance.
An opportunity to make an impact
Harold Laswell (1970) famously declared that the goal of policy research was ‘knowledge
of’ and ‘knowledge in’ the policy process. For the public administration community,
much can be gained from greater knowledge of and in crisis management. The call
for more ‘knowledge of’ crisis management points to the need to develop systematic
empirical findings and robust theoretical insights that reflect the context of contemporary
governance. The call for more ‘knowledge in’ crisis management points to the need
to engage in the world of practice, by ‘opening up’ processes and institutions of crisis
management, by speaking (often unpalatable) truths to power, and by suggesting ways
to tame crisis-induced uncertainty that cannot be found through research frameworks
developed for ‘stable’ times.
Public administration researchers have traditionally aimed to make an impact on the
community of practitioners. If there ever was both a need and an opportunity, it is now.
Practitioners are wrestling with the challenges that new types of crisis impose upon them.
Public administration as a field has much to offer. It contains expertise in the areas of
information management, inter-agency coordination, institutional design, public–private
partnerships,multilevel governance, public leadership and accountability. It harbours spe-
cialized knowledge with regard to natural disaster response, risk management regulation
and the politics of crisis management. These discussions are all relevant to building amore
resilient society, regardless of specific political, administrative or wider social constraints.
The opportunity lies in bringing together the many insights that are found in various
subfields of public administration research, and developing analytical tools that facilitate
enriched understanding of ways for political and administrative actors to move forward
in an effective and legitimate manner.
NOTES
1 We wish to thank Chris Ansell and Sanneke Kuipers for their constructive feedback on an earlier version of this article. We
thank Monica O’Connor for her excellent editorial assistance.
2 This was one of the key findings of the EU-funded Anvil project, which compared the civil protection systems of 22 European
countries (Kuipers et al. 2015). For more information, see www.anvil-project.net
3 For an example of such a research effort, see the EU-funded Transcrisis project in which the authors of this article participate.
For more information, see www.transcrisis.eu
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